
Is Cryptography Going to Be an Engineering Discipline?

Sven Laur University of Tartu

swen@math.ut.ee


What is a cryptographic proof?

Cryptographic proof manipulates objects with abstract properties



- ▷ Does the proof provide an optimal upper bounds?
- ▷ Is the construction itself optimal?
- > Are there any alternative solutions with different primitives?

What is a cryptographic primitive?



- ▷ A primitive is a black-box object that provides certain services.
- ▷ Objects returned by the primitive are from an abstract (algebraic) domain.
- ▷ Only way to convert outputs to something useful is to use the functions of the primitive to convert inputs from one domain to the other.
- ▶ These restrictions do not apply to potential adversaries.

A security game

$$(\mathsf{pk}_0, \mathsf{sk}_0) \leftarrow \mathrm{Gen}$$

$$(\mathsf{pk}_1, \mathsf{sk}_1) \leftarrow \mathrm{Gen}$$

$$(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$$

$$b_0, b_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$$

$$c_0 \leftarrow \mathrm{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_0}(m_{b_0})$$

$$c_1 \leftarrow \mathrm{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_1}(m_{b_1})$$


$$q \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c_0, c_1)$$

$$\mathrm{iseq} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{sk}_q)$$

$$\mathrm{return} \ [(b_0 \stackrel{?}{=} b_1) \stackrel{?}{=} \mathrm{iseq}]$$

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{G}_0}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr\left[\mathcal{G}_0^{\mathcal{A}} = 1\right]$$


Security of a primitive



A cryptographic primitive is characterised by a time-success profile $\varepsilon(t)$ that is quantified as a maximal success probability in a certain game.

Proofs by reductions

A classical way to prove security of a derived primitive is to transform a successful adversary $\mathcal A$ against the primitive to a new adversary $\mathcal B$ against one of the primary primitives.



Usually, we need to do a lengthy and detailed probability calculations in order to find the quantitative properties of a reduction.

Drawbacks of direct reductions

Direct probability computations


- > Analysis of randomised algorithms is technical.
- ▶ Most of us cannot correctly operate with probabilities.
- ∀ Verification of these calculations is equivalent to the derivation of them.

Proofs are unstructured

- ▷ To verify a proof, one must debug a complex algorithm.
- ▷ Proofs are several pages long even for simple problems.
- > Analysis of a full-blown system could be hundreds of pages long.

Game-playing proofs ≡ Structured proofs


Complex proofs can be represented by game trees.



- Structured proof reveals many repeated arguments.
- Probability calculations can be automated.

Proof compaction \equiv **Reduction schemata**


We can use a single meta-proof and instantiate for every possible sub-proof.



- ▷ Construction and analysis of randomised algorithms is abstracted away.
- ▷ It is possible to support parametrised reductions.
- > Application of reduction schemata happens on the syntactical level.

A final compacted proof

The final compacted proof tree can be checked syntactically, except for preconditions of reduction schemata. These must be verified separately.



Proof phases

- Primitive elimination phase few well-documented reduction schemata.
- ♦ Analysis of combinatorial games many informal code transformations.

Primitive elimination

It must be possible to eliminate all primitives.

- ▶ For each abstract function there must be an elimination rule.
- □ Usually, there are many rules for an abstract function.
- > All preconditions can be formalised through reachability and dependencies

Example. IND-CPA reduction schema

$$(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen$$

$$\cdots$$

$$m_0 \leftarrow \cdots$$

$$m_1 \leftarrow \cdots$$

$$c \leftarrow \operatorname{Enc}_{pk}(m_0)$$

$$\cdots$$

$$(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen$$

$$\cdots$$

$$m_0 \leftarrow \cdots$$

$$m_1 \leftarrow \cdots$$

$$c \leftarrow \operatorname{Enc}_{pk}(m_1)$$

$$\cdots$$

Reduction is applicable when:

- \triangleright No variables accessible by the adversary \mathcal{A} depend on sk.
- \triangleright No $\mathrm{Dec}_{\mathsf{sk}}(\cdot)$ calls are made during the game.

Example. IND-CCA2 reduction schema

$$(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen$$

$$\cdots$$

$$m_0 \leftarrow \cdots$$

$$m_1 \leftarrow \cdots$$

$$c \leftarrow \operatorname{Enc}_{pk}(m_0)$$

$$\cdots$$

$$(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen$$

$$\cdots$$

$$m_0 \leftarrow \cdots$$

$$m_1 \leftarrow \cdots$$

$$c \leftarrow \operatorname{Enc}_{pk}(m_0)$$


$$c \leftarrow \operatorname{Enc}_{pk}(m_1)$$

$$\cdots$$

Reduction is applicable when:

- \triangleright No variables accessible by the adversary \mathcal{A} depend on sk.
- \triangleright No $\mathrm{Dec}_{\mathsf{sk}}(c)$ calls are made after reaching line $c \leftarrow \mathrm{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(m_0)$.

Why branching is unavoidable



Benefits and hurdles

What does such a proof system give?

- ▷ Eliminates need for probability calculations.
- ▷ Eliminates need for creative steps.
- ▶ Makes error-free analysis of asynchronous systems tractable.

Why do not we have such a proof system?

- ▷ Exact implementation details matter a lot.
- ▶ Most current solutions do not preserve high-level description of games.
- ▶ Most of the reduction schemata belong to combinatorial phase.
- > Formal proofs for reachability and independence are tedious.

Help needed!

Questions and answers are welcome!